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Harm to Competition Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
Introduction 
 In August, 2010, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission issued 
new Guidelines for the assessment of mergers between competitors under the antitrust 
laws.1  These Guidelines were long awaited not merely because of the lengthy interval 
between them and earlier Guidelines,2 but also because enforcement policy had drifted 
far from the standards articulated in the previous Guidelines. 
The 2010 Guidelines are distinctive manly for two things.  One is notably briefer 
and less detailed treatment of market delineation.  The other is an expanded set of 
theories of harm that justify preventing mergers or reversing mergers that have already 
occurred.  These are both positive developments.  Older Guidelines were overly 
technocratic and excessively wed to methodologies that were at the forefront of applied 
merger analysis when they were drafted, but that tended to make the Guidelines 
obsolete as new methodologies became available.  Not only do methodologies change, 
they are also specific to the situation (Carlton, 2010). They also tend to be well 
developed in the literature and accessible to experts consulted by those defending a 
merger as well as government economists.  As a result, detailed treatment of the 
technological methodologies that will be used is generally unnecessary.  The 2010 
Guidelines are more flexible than previous Guidelines and also more catholic about the 
types of harms that mergers might cause and the techniques that can be used to 
assess them (Shapiro, 2010). 
To be sure, there is a tradeoff between flexibility and guidance.  Often we can 
have more of one only by giving up some of the other, and that tradeoff is clearly 
present in the 2010 Guidelines.  In general, however, they seem to have struck the 
balance in about the right place.  One hesitates to compare the 2010 Merger Guidelines 
to the 1968 Guidelines, given that the 1968 Guidelines are so strongly identified with the 
excesses of a bygone era.  Even so, at the time the 1968 Guidelines were a 
considerable improvement over the then existing case law (Lande, 2010; Baker & 
Blumenthal, 1983; Leary, 2002).   Further, the concerns expressed in the 2010 
                                                             
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
1 United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merber Guidelines 
(August 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html. 
2 Previous Guidelines were issued in 1968, 1982 (revised in 1984), and 1992.  The Agencies also revised 
the 1992 Guidelines in 1997 with an updated statement on efficiencies, and in 2006 they issued a 
“Commentary” on the 1992 Guidelines.  The 2010 Guidelines state in a footnote that the Commentary 
“remains a valuable supplement” to the 2010 Guidelines.  The Commentary is available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm.  
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Guidelines are fundamentally very different from those discussed in the 1968 
Guidelines.  Nevertheless, to a large extent the 2010 Guidelines end a trend toward 
defining the scope of antitrust concern with mergers more narrowly and more 
technically.  The 1968 Guidelines were also more eclectic in their approach, although 
they were also very ambiguous. They never spoke of “collusion” as such, or even of 
“coordinated interaction” or “oligopoly.”  In this sense the theory of the 1968 Guidelines 
was pure structuralism.  They did not insist on a high degree of specification of the 
possible modes of anticompetitive behavior, but only proof of a structure that was 
deemed to be anticompetitive in and of itself because it led automatically to these 
behaviors.3  The 2010 Guidelines are equally eclectic, but they have departed from the 
structuralism of the 1960s further than any intervening set of Guidelines. 
The 2010 Guidelines reflect a growing belief that in markets where product 
differentiation is minimal competition tends to be robust, and the structural presumptions 
stated in all the previous Guidelines were too harsh.  By contrast, where product 
differentiation is substantial the approach in the previous Guidelines’ tended to define 
markets too broadly, overlooking significantly anticompetitive possibilities. 
 This essay looks very briefly at four substantive merger concerns that are 
addressed in the 2010 Guidelines: exclusion, restraints on innovation, unilateral effects, 
and coordinated effects.  It concludes with a few observations about market definition 
and post-acquisition assessment under the Guidelines. 
Mergers and Exclusion 
 The 2010 Guidelines state that the relevant statutory provisions covered include 
not only the antimerger provision, §7 of the Clayton Act, but also sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.4  Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act reaches only “exclusionary” practices.  The 2010 Guidelines contain an 
opening statement to the effect that “Enhanced market power may also make it more 
likely that the merged entity can profitably and effectively engage in exclusionary 
conduct” (2010 Guidelines, §1). 
Consideration of exclusionary practices as a rationale for condemning mergers is 
not particularly well developed in the 2010 Guidelines, but it was not present at all in the 
1992 Guidelines.  Exclusionary practices were mentioned briefly in the much more 
                                                             
3 See, e.g., Kaysen and Turner, 1959 (arguing that anticompetitive performance is inherent in 
concentrated markets). 
415 U.S.C. §18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, and 15 U.S.C. §45.  The Statement about §5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, which is enforceable only by the Federal Trade Commission, is interesting.  In this case 
the FTC has authority to enforce the Clayton Act directly, so it is also unclear that adding §5 of the FTCA 
does anything unless there is a basis for thinking that §5 reaches merger conduct that neither the Sherman 
Act nor §7 of the Clayton Act reaches.  
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aggressive 1968 Merger Guidelines, issued when Donald F. Turner was head of the 
Antitrust Division.5  One of the stated concerns of horizontal merger policy was 
“preventing any company or small group of companies from obtaining a position of 
dominance in a market” (1968  Merger Guidelines, I.4.).  The 1968 Guidelines 
elaborated that “the larger the market share held by the acquiring firm, the more likely it 
is that an acquisition will move it toward, or further entrench it in, a position of 
dominance or of shared market power.”  However, the 1968 Guidelines went on to state 
thresholds that would prohibit acquisitions creating post-merger firms with minimum 
market shares as little as 8% to 16%, provided that the market was regarded as “highly 
concentrated,” which meant a CR4 of 75 or more.6  Those Guidelines also required 
elevated scrutiny of markets exhibiting a “trend toward concentration.” (§I,7)  The 1968 
Guidelines also expressed concern about the acquisitions of competitors who had been 
particularly “disruptive” in the market, as well as acquisitions of firms that possessed “an 
unusual competitive potential” or “an asset that confers an unusual competitive 
advantage,” which included “a patent on a significantly improved product or production 
process.” (I,8) 
While renewing this concern about mergers facilitating exclusionary conduct, the 
2010 Guidelines do not suggest a broad mandate for using §2 of the Sherman Act to 
prohibit mergers simply because they increase the likelihood of exclusionary practices.7  
The Sherman Act does not contain the incipiency “may substantially lessen competition” 
language of §7 of the Clayton Act and presumably requires an actual or at least 
intended exclusionary practice, not the mere creation of a structure that is conducive to 
one.  On the other hand, §7 of the Clayton Act can be brought to bear.  The theory 
would be that an acquisition could be the means by which a firm attempts to acquire or 
perhaps to maintain a dominant position.8 The 2010 Guidelines give this example: 
Merging Firms A and B operate in a market in which network effects are 
significant, implying that any firm’s product is significantly more valuable if it 
commands a large market share or if it is interconnected with others that in 
aggregate command such a share. Prior to the merger, they and their rivals 
voluntarily interconnect with one another. The merger would create an entity with 
                                                             
5 They were drafted while Turner was Head of the Antitrust Division, but released on the day that he left 
office.  See Hovenkamp, 2010a.  These Guidelines are available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.pdf. 
6 Id., I.5.  The CR4, or four firm concentration ratio that was used in the 1968 Guidelines, is the sum of 
the market shares of the largest four firms in the market. 
7 Cf. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (refusing to enjoin merger at request of private 
plaintiff claiming that merger would enable post-merger firm to engage in aggressive anticompetitive 
pricing).  See Areeda & Hovenkamp (2007).  
8 Section 6 the 2010 Guidelines also speaks of “exclusionary unilateral effects,” although without adding 
any substance to that concern.  2010 Guidelines, §6. 
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a large enough share that a strategy of ending voluntary interconnection would 
have a dangerous probability of creating monopoly power in this market. The 
interests of rivals and of consumers would be broadly aligned in preventing such 
a merger (2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, §2). 
 This suggested application to networks and dominance is novel in the Merger 
Guidelines, but hardly unwarranted.  As a general matter nondominant firms in networks 
require compatibility in order to compete.  By contrast, dominant firms may be in a 
position to profit from incompatibility (Areeda and Hovenkamp, 2008).9  As the 
Guidelines observe, the interests of consumers are almost always aligned with 
compatibility, which tends to make networked markets larger overall and more 
competitive internally.  
Restraints on Innovation 
Practices that restrain innovation can be both collusive10 and exclusionary11 or 
sometimes both.12  The 1968 Guidelines contained a statement on innovation to the 
effect that: 
the Department has used Section 7 to prevent mergers which may diminish long-
run possibilities of enhanced competition resulting from technological 
developments that may increase inter-product competition between industries 
whose products are presently relatively imperfect substitutes (1968 Merger 
Guidelines, III, 20).13 
 
The 1984 Guidelines noted briefly that market share figures might overstate a 
firm’s competitive significance if rivals had access to a technology that the firm in 
question did not (1984 Guidelines, §3.2.1). The 1992 guidelines treatment of innovation 
was limited to a single footnote in its opening statement on market power, to the effect 
that “[s]ellers with market power also may lessen competition on dimensions other than 
price, such as product quality, service, or innovation” (1992 Guidelines, §0.1, n.6.).14  
                                                             
9 See also Areeda & Hovenkamp, 2010 (refusal to deal in dominated networks); Hovenkamp, H. (2010b). 
The concern is expanded and specifically related to innovation intensive markets in Bohanan and 
Hovenkamp, 2011b.  
10 See, e.g., United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal 1969), appeal dismissed 
sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970), modified sub nom. United States v. 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 65,088 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (cartel to restrain 
development of automobile air pollution control equipment). 
11 E.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 77-78 (D.C.Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 
(2001) (Microsoft pressure on Intel to abandon development of multiplatform chip). 
12 E.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 486 U.S. 492, 496-497 (1988) (standard setting 
organization captured by manufacturers of steel conduit boycotts maker of technologically superior PVC 
conduit).  See Bohannan & Hovenkamp, 2011b.  
13 The 1968 Guidelines also indicated that traditional market definition criteria might not be used in 
markets subject to rapid technological change, but did not provide details.  See id., 1. 
14 These Guidelines are available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.shtm. 
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They never returned to the subject.  However, the Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property, which were issued in1995, focused a great deal of attention on 
licensing practices in innovation intensive markets and occasionally referenced situations 
where the nature of a license or joint venture entailed that the transaction should be 
treated more like a merger than a contract.15  The licensing Guidelines also developed the 
idea of an “innovation market,” a concept that the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines do 
not repeat.  The 2006 Commentary on the 1992 Merger Guidelines also speak in several 
places about the relevance of innovation, although they also do not return to the subject of 
innovation markets.16 
 
Restraints on innovation are addressed in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
mainly in the category of unilateral effects.  The Guidelines have a separate section on 
mergers limiting “innovation and product variety” (2010 Guidelines, §6.4) which is 
concerned with “unilateral effects arising from diminished innovation or reduced product 
variety.”  As the Guidelines state: 
The Agencies may consider whether a merger is likely to diminish innovation 
competition by encouraging the merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below 
the level that would prevail in the absence of the merger. That curtailment of 
innovation could take the form of reduced incentive to continue with an existing 
product-development effort or reduced incentive to initiate development of new 
products. 
The first of these effects is most likely to occur if at least one of the 
merging firms is engaging in efforts to introduce new products that would 
capture substantial revenues from the other merging firm. The second, longer-
run effect is most likely to occur if at least one of the merging firms has 
capabilities that are likely to lead it to develop new products in the future that 
would capture substantial revenues from the other merging firm. The Agencies 
therefore also consider whether a merger will diminish innovation competition by 
combining two of a very small number of firms with the strongest capabilities to 
successfully innovate in a specific direction. 
The Agencies evaluate the extent to which successful innovation by one 
merging firm is likely to take sales from the other, and the extent to which post-
merger incentives for future innovation will be lower than those that would prevail 
in the absence of the merger. 
 In sum, the story closely resembles that of diverted sales on the demand side, 
except that in this case the emphasis is on diversion of supply through innovation.  The 
                                                             
15 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, (1995) Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property, §3.2.3, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm. 
16 See Commentary, Introduction (noting that market power may be exercised by slowing down 
innovation and that reduced innovation is an anticompetitive effect).  See also id., §4 (innovation and 
efficiencies defense).  
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concern is hardly fanciful and some version of it has been known in antitrust since the 
beginning of the twentieth century.  For example, in the Paper Bag patent litigation, 
which reached the Supreme Court in 1908, the dominant firm had acquired a patent in a 
technology that competed with technology it was already using.  It did not use the patent 
at all, preferring to stick with its existing technology, but also refused to license it to 
others and filed a successful infringement action against a rival firm that apparently 
independently developed technology that infringed the acquired patent.17 
A similar concern is also expressed in the Antitrust Law treatise, which argues 
that an appropriate remedy in most such cases is to permit dominant firms to acquire 
nonexclusive licenses in patents that lie at the heart of their power, but not exclusive 
licenses (Areeda and Hovenkamp, 2008). Prohibiting such acquisitions altogether often 
precludes firms from keeping their own technology up to date.  In order to accomplish 
this, however, they do not need the patent’s power to exclude; they need only access to 
patented technology developed by others.  As a result, permitting the acquisition of 
nonexclusive licenses strikes about the right balance between denying a dominant firm 
access to essential technology and permitting it to exclude others from its market. 
Both the acquisition and the nonuse of a patent are lawful acts in and of 
themselves.18  However, the combination of acquisition and nonuse represents a 
different concern – a practice that is not authorized by the Patent Act and that can result 
in the suppression of competition.  Indeed, the acquisition and nonuse of patent can be 
far more threatening to competition than the acquisition of a production facility, whether 
or not it is shut down.  When an acquired plant or other productive facility is taken off 
the market or out of production by a merger, others can build a rival plant depending on 
the height of entry barriers and other market factors.  But a patent forecloses all 
technologies covered by its claims whether or not it is actually being practiced.  For 
example, if a dominant firm with Alpha technology sees a close rival with incipient Beta 
technology that threatens to compete with Alpha, acquisition of the firm with the Beta 
technology eliminates not only that firm as a competitive threat but also takes the Beta 
technology and any technology covered by the Beta patent claims off the market 
altogether (Bohannan and Hovenkamp, 2011a).  In the Paper Bag decision discussed 
above the patentee acquired the competing technology and did not practice the patent 
at all.  Further, the rival was guilty of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, 
                                                             
17 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).  For more on the 
litigation, see Bohannan and Hovenkamp, 2011b.  
18 Patents are freely assignable.  35 U.S.C. §261.  Under the Paper Bag case, (Continental Paper Bag Co. 
v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908)), a patentee need not practice it in order to bring an 
infringement action.  However, under the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 
(547 U.S. 388, 392-393 (2006)), nonpracticing patentees may see their remedies limited to damages rather 
than an injunction.  See Hovenkamp (2010 c). 
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which in that case meant that his technology did not literally infringe the acquired patent 
at all but merely reached the same result. 
Patents are unquestionably “assets” reachable by §7 (Areeda and Hovenkamp, 
2009). At the time a patent is acquired neither the government nor anyone else may 
know whether the acquiring firm intends to practice it.  But the exclusive or nonexclusive 
nature of the assignment is knowable and exclusive assignments in areas subject to 
dominance should be regarded as suspicious.  Further, exclusivity is almost never 
essential to protect any legitimate interest of the acquiring firm.  Its legitimate interest is 
to be able to practice the best technology itself, but not to prevent others from using 
technology that it did not develop itself. 
Of course, a nonexclusive license may be worth less to the acquirer than an 
exclusive license, and this may injure the inventor/assignor of the patent.  An exclusive 
right to the patent in the hands of the dominant firm who does not intend to use it could 
be worth more than a nonexclusive right held by that firm or others.  But patents do not 
create entitlements to market monopolies any more than ownership of a production 
plant entitles one to a monopoly in its product market, or to sell it subject to a an 
anticompetitive noncompetition agreement.  That is, the general rule that assets can be 
freely transferred to the highest bidder clearly applies to patents, but it is just as clearly 
subject to the constraint that anticompetitive transactions can be enjoined within they 
fall within the prohibitions of the antitrust laws. 
Product Differentiation and Unilateral Effects 
 The ideas of product differentiation and heightened scrutiny for mergers of more 
“adjacent” firms in product differentiated markets have been around at least since 
Harold Hotelling’s work in the late 1920s on spatially differentiated markets and the 
output responses that firms make to closer and more remote rivals (Hoteling,1929; 
Areeda and Hovenkamp, 2009; Hovenkamp, 2011; Coate, 2008)19  Already in its 1948 
Columbia Steel decision the Supreme Court noted its significance.  The merging firms, 
United States Steel and Consolidated Steel, were rivals in the highly differentiated 
market for steel fabrications.  The market was divided into structural and plate 
fabrication.  The former included materials for steel frame buildings, bridges, towers, 
and the like.  The latter included such things as pressure tanks and pipes.  Finally, the 
industry was divided into light and heavy fabrication, depending on the size and weight 
of the parts to be made.  One critical component in the Court’s decision was evidence 
that during a ten year period the acquiring firm had bid on 2409 jobs and the acquired 
firm on 6377 jobs.  However, both companies bid on only 166 of these jobs.  The Court 
noted that while “such figures are not conclusive of lack of competition,” the fact was 
                                                             
19 See also Werden & Froeb, 2008; Baker & Bresnahan, 1985.  
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that the list of structural components sold by one of the firms was quite different from 
the list sold by the other.  It agreed with the district court that the amount of competition 
between the two firms was “not substantial.” 20  To express this in today’s parlance, the 
diversion ratio from United States Steel to Consolidated was so small that a merger of 
the two would not materially affect the post-merger firm’s ability to impose a small but 
significant and nontransitory increase in price. 
 Every set of Merger Guidelines has acknowledged product differentiation, but 
they have expressed different views about how the presence of differentiated products 
should affect the analysis of mergers.  In the 1968 Guidelines product differentiation 
was an exacerbating factor, as it was in most of the structuralist analysis from the 1930s 
through the 1960s.  For example, the Guidelines expressed concern about vertical 
mergers that might “facilitat[e] promotional product differentiation” at the retail level 
(1968 Merger Guidelines, II, 11). With respect to conglomerate mergers the 1968 
Guidelines were concerned about mergers that “may enhance the ability of the merged 
firm to increase product differentiation in the relevant markets” (1968 Merger 
Guidelines, III, 20).21 
 At the other extreme, the 1982/1984 Guidelines, which were heavily concerned 
with coordinated interaction, largely regarded product differentiation as a mitigating 
factor.  As those Guidelines explained, “with a homogeneous and undifferentiated 
product a cartel need establish only a single price – a circumstance that facilitates 
reaching consensus and detecting deviation.”  However, when products are 
differentiated problems of coordination become more complex.  As a result, “when the 
relevant product is completely homogeneous and undifferentiated, the Department is 
more likely to challenge the merger,” but less likely to challenge it if the product is “sold 
subject to complex configuration options or customized production…” (1984 Merger 
Guidelines, §3.411).  The 1984 Guidelines did acknowledge in a later section that a 
characteristic of product differentiation is closer and more distant substitutes, and that 
the Department would look more closely at mergers of closer substitutes (1984 Merger 
Guidelines, §3.413). The 1992 Guidelines developed the problem of unilateral effects in 
product differentiated markets at somewhat greater length, but not as expansively as it 
is treated in the 2010 Guidelines (1992 Guidelines, §2.2). 
The theory of unilateral effects is intuitively simple.  In product differentiated 
markets firms are not price takers.  Rather, they have at least limited power over price 
                                                             
20 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 499-500, 516 & n.3 (1948). 
21 However, the Guidelines added this caveat: “Generally speaking, the conglomerate merger area 
involves novel problems that have not yet been subjected to as extensive or sustained analysis as those 
presented by horizontal and vertical mergers. It is for this reason that the Department's enforcement 
policy regarding the foregoing category of conglomerate mergers cannot be set forth with greater 
specificity” (1968 Merger Guidelines, III, 20).  
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depending on the degree of difference between their own product and that of rivals, 
including factors such as rivals’ ability to expand output or reconfigure their products so 
as to move more closely into the primary firm’s product space.  Further, the differences 
exist on a continuum. More adjacent rivals offer more competition.  When a firm 
unilaterally increases its price while costs remain constant it will lose some but not all 
sales.  More adjacent rivals (in either product or geographic space) will divert more 
sales, while remote rivals will divert fewer.  As a result a merger with a relatively 
adjacent partner – say, among the two or three closest rivals – will enable the post-
merger firm to lose fewer sales because at least a portion of the sales that are diverted 
to this particular rival will then be retained within the post-merger firm. 
Analysis of unilateral anticompetitive effects requires considering whether the 
amount of net lost output in response to a given price increase is sufficiently diminished 
by a merger so as to make that price increase profitable.  For example, a firm producing 
500 units might lose 25 units of output in response to a 5% price increase.  Assume that 
an output reduction of this magnitude would make the price increase unprofitable.  
Suppose that the 25 units went 10 units to firm A, 8 units to firm B, and 7 units to firm C.  
In that case, if the firm in question should acquire firm B, it might suffer a loss of only 17 
units in response to its 5% price increase, and this increase might be profitable.22 
This analysis is “static,” in the sense that it compares two “output snapshots” of 
the firm’s position before and after the merger, and assumes that other firms will not 
change their price or output behavior significantly in response to the price increase 
(Ordover, 2008; Carlton, 2010; Kovacic et al., 2009).23  To the extent that other firms 
can readily reposition themselves closer to the product space occupied by the post-
merger firm, the price increase will be lower.24  To the extent other firms “coordinate” by 
playing follow the leader and increasing their own prices it might be higher.  By and 
large the Guidelines make neither assumption.25 
 The unilateral effects analysis provisions in the 2010 Guidelines certainly do not 
reflect any more speculation or uncertainty than is present in the more traditional 
                                                             
22 Using a technique called critical loss analysis the Agencies’ economists may try to identify how many 
sales must be lost in response to a price increase of a given magnitude, and then consider whether the 
actual loss is greater than or less than the critical loss.  See, e.g., City of New York v. Group Health, Inc., 
2008 WL 4974578 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2008) (critical loss analysis relevant to determination of amount of 
price increase that would likely occur subsequent to a merger); Delco LLC v. Giant of Maryland, LLC, 
2007 WL 3307018 (D.N.J. Nov. 8, 2008) (similar). See Shapiro, 2010; Farrell & Shapiro, 2008).  
23 See also Werden & Froeb, 2006.  
24 See Gurrea & Owen, 2003 (criticizing unilateral effects analysis for not taking dynamic response 
possibilities into account). 
25 See e.g., United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1121-1122 (N.D.Cal. 2004) (criticizing 
the government for not considering extent to which third party firms might respond to post-merger firm’s 
attempted unilateral price increase). 
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analysis depending on coordinated interaction, notwithstanding that the latter has been 
in use far longer.  While the HHI may add an appearance of scientific rigor to 
coordinated effects analysis, that index actually incorporates many conjectures about 
firm behavior and rival responses that may or may not apply in any given situation.  In 
general, unilateral effects are easier to model precisely because there are not so many 
behavioral assumptions to be taken into account (Ordover, 2007). 
 As the Guidelines indicate, traditional market definition plays a smaller role in 
unilateral effects analysis.  The 2010 Guidelines indicate that the Agencies will look for 
direct evidence of upward pricing pressure that is likely to result in post-merger price 
increases.26  As the conclusion to this paper suggests, while reliance on a traditional 
market definition has been standard in merger analysis the statutes do not appear to 
compel it and the “substantially lessen competition” formulation of §7 of the Clayton Act 
would appear to permit it. 
Coordinated Interaction 
 
Coordinated effects analysis of mergers requires a prediction about how a 
merger might change firms’ incentives to coordinate their behavior.  In part this analysis 
is structural, relating to the number of firms in the market, their size distribution, ease of 
entry, degree of product differentiation, whether transactions are transparent or secret, 
ratios of fixed to variable costs, to name a few (Shapiro, 1989). But the query is also 
substantially “behavioral,” in the sense that it relates to assumptions about how firms 
respond to the behavior of other firms.  In general, neither structural nor behavioral 
assumptions make much difference in very unconcentrated and homogeneous markets, 
                                                             
26 See 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, §6.1: 
 
Adverse unilateral price effects can arise when the merger gives the merged entity an incentive to 
raise the price of a product previously sold by one merging firm and thereby divert sales to 
products previously sold by the other merging firm, boosting the profits on the latter products. 
Taking as given other prices and product offerings, that boost to profits is equal to the value to the 
merged firm of the sales diverted to those products. The value of sales diverted to a product is 
equal to the number of units diverted to that product multiplied by the margin between price and 
incremental cost on that product. In some cases, where sufficient information is available, the 
Agencies assess the value of diverted sales, which can serve as an indicator of the upward pricing 
pressure on the first product resulting from the merger. Diagnosing unilateral price effects based 
on the value of diverted sales need not rely on market definition or the calculation of market 
shares and concentration. The Agencies rely much more on the value of diverted sales than on the 
level of the HHI for diagnosing unilateral price effects in markets with differentiated products. If 
the value of diverted sales is proportionately small, significant unilateral price effects are 
unlikely. 
On upward pricing pressure, or UPP, see. Farrell and Shapiro, 2010. Briefly, the UPP index asks whether 
the upward pressure resulting from the elimination of competition between two firms (a function of the 
diversion ratio and price-cost margins) exceeds any downward pricing pressure resulting from cost 
savings.  Formally, application requires knowledge of the diversion ratio and price cost margins as well as 
efficiency gains, but not market definition (Das Varma, 2009). 
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where firms have little power to set output or price strategically vis-à-vis other firms 
except by collusion.  But the assumptions can become critical in the relevant range of 
analysis, most typically where markets have between three and seven or eight firms. 
 
Indeed, one defense of increased use of unilateral effects analysis is that 
coordinated effects analysis is sensitive to many assumptions about firm’s reactions that 
cannot practicably be tested in any rigorous fashion.  The HHI, particularly as used in 
the in the Merger Guidelines from 1982 to 1992, belied much of this complexity by 
focusing so strongly on two issues, market definition and concentration measures.  The 
HHI itself is directly derived from Cournot assumptions (Stigler, 1964).27  Although the 
assumptions are rational, particularly when products are homogenous, they are 
empirically not clearly more reliable than a much simpler index, such as the CR4, which 
is easier to use. 28 
 
For the most part, what happened during the 1990s and a little after is that the 
“other factors” portions of the Guidelines ended up doing much more of the work, and 
the importance of the Guidelines’ structural presumptions became much less important.  
Indeed, during the first decade of this century the HHI structural indicators expressed in 
the 1992 Guidelines proved to be very poor predictors of merger challenges. 
 
The de-emphasis on structure is a good thing, but one must query whether it has 
gone far enough.  The fact is that the HHI expresses a rigid Cournot formulation about 
output setting in undifferentiated markets.  In that sense it is pure structuralism, and its 
use is consistent with only a few of the alternative behavioral assumptions that go into 
the analysis of coordinated interaction.  Even internally, the Guidelines reflect diverse 
behavioral assumptions, indulging an assumption of no response at all in unilateral 
effects analysis, but of Cournot-style optimization of output in coordinated effects 
analysis. 
 
Consider one set of situations where the HHI can throw merger analysis off 
course.  For any given number of firms the HHI is minimized when they are all of equal 
size.  The greater are the disparities in size, the higher the HHI.29  In an undifferentiated 
market this result is directly derived from an orthodox Cournot assumption that each 
firm takes the other firms’ output as given and maximizes from that point (Stigler, 1964; 
Gans, 2007; Carlton, 2004). But that is only one among a number of quite reasonable 
behavioral assumptions.  For example, if the firms are colluding and the market is 
subject to scale economies, larger firms could have lower per unit costs, and this could 
                                                             
27 See Baker, 2010, noting that under Stigler’s analysis the HHI is a predictor of cartel stability.  
28 Cohen & Sullivan, 1983 (HHI generally no better); Kwoka, 1979; Kwoka, 1985 (same).  Jon Baker 
more recently concluded that “empirical literature does not provide a strong basis for choosing any 
particular measure of market concentration, though it is not inconsistent with the common modern 
antitrust practice of using the HHI to represent concentration.” 
29 For example, four 25% firms have an HHI of 2500, bringing the market just to the bottom edge of 
highly concentrated.  However, if this market has firms of 30, 25, 25, and 20, then the HHI is 2550.  If it 
has two 30 percent firms the HHI is 3050. 
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serve to undermine rather than support the cartel.  Indeed, the 1984 Merger Guidelines 
took such disparities into account and considered them as a mitigating factor to the 
extent that they tended to destabilize a cartel (1984 Guidelines, §3.411).30 
 
Whether these variations matter depends largely on how closely one follows the 
HHI numbers.  The answer under the 1992 Guidelines was not very closely.  The 2010 
Guidelines respond by increasing the thresholds, which certainly brings them into closer 
alignment with enforcement policy.  That nevertheless leaves the question of how much 
independent useful information the HHI itself provides.  The Guidelines suggest strong 
concern with post merger markets that contain the “equivalent” of four equal size firms.  
But equivalency here is a big word and reflects a wide range of structures as well as a 
range of quite plausible assumptions about behavior.  The Government might do well 
simply to abandon the HHI and state its concerns in terms of the number of significant 
players that have the ability to appropriate one another’s output. 
 
Conclusion: 
Market Delineation and the Importance of Post-Merger Review 
 
One result of unilateral effects analysis in the Guidelines is that in the presence 
of product differentiation the “relevant market” can be quite small, often limited to three 
or four firms and excluding other firms whose products are in some general sense 
substitutes for the products of the post-merger firm.  Unlike the 2010 Guidelines, the 
1992 Guidelines applied coordinated effects analysis only when the post-merger firm’s 
market share exceeded 35% (1992 Guidelines, §2.211). This section in turn was 
borrowed from the “leading firm proviso” in the 1984 Merger Guidelines, which was 
concerned with situations where a “leading firm” – one with a market share of 35% or 
more – acquired a small firm.  The 1984 Guidelines indicated that the concern in this 
situation was with unilateral rather than multilateral price increases (1984 Guidelines, 
§3.12). By abandoning this limitation the 2010 Guidelines make it possible to analyze a 
merger without defining the broader “market” at all.  There is nothing wrong with such 
an approach, provided that it takes realistic account of likely customer behavior and rival 
responses (see Carlton, 2010).  
 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act condemns mergers whose effects are felt in some 
“line of commerce” and in some “section of the country.”  Intuitively these descriptions 
seem to be related to geographic and product market definition, respectively and the 
Supreme Court has stated that “the proper definition of the market is a ‘necessary 
predicate’ to an examination of the competition that may be affected by the horizontal 
aspects of the merger.”31  However, they certainly do not suggest antitrust market 
                                                             
30 Often in differentiated markets the firms could not set a single cartel price but would have to establish a 
schedule of prices.  On size disparities as a destabilizing factor in cartels, see Porter, 2005; Cave & Salant, 
1995.  
31 Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294,322 n 38.   The Court borrowed the formulation from United 
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957); and also United States v. Columbia 
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948), which first used the term “relevant market” and related market 
shares to illegality.  See Werden, G.J. (2009); Werden, G. J. (1997).  
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definition as it has been applied since the second half of the twentieth century32 and 
historically they almost certainly were not meant to require a formal market definition at 
all.  Outside of the Clayton Act context the phrase “line of commerce” was very 
commonly used more generically to refer to a particular “line” of business or a set of 
products that a casual observer would view as competing with one another in the sense 
of rivalry.  For example, referring to the pigment industry the Supreme Court stated in 
1875 that oxides and zinc are “staples of trade in that line of commerce.”33  Business of 
a certain type, such as women’s clothing or groceries, was commonly referred to as a 
“line.”  Thus courts interpreted commercial contracts by looking to customs and usages 
of trade in that “line of commerce.”34 
 
Nothing in the legislative history of the Clayton Act suggests that Congress 
meant any more than to make the provision reach mergers that threatened to be 
anticompetitive in some “line.”  By the same token, the phrase “section of the country” 
was almost certainly intended to be jurisdictional.  That is, Congress wanted to make 
clear that it was concerned about mergers whose impact was felt in some part of the 
United States rather than abroad.  This is bolstered by the fact that the other 
substantive provisions of the Clayton Act contained similar limitations that obvious did 
not pertain to market definition.  For example, original §2 of the Clayton Act, which 
condemned a form of predatory pricing, reached only commodities destined for use, 
sale or consumption in the United States.35  Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which pertains 
to tying and exclusive dealing, contains a similar limitation.36 
 
Markets in merger analysis are not defined for their own sake, but rather in order 
to ascertain whether a particular alteration in market structure covered by the merger 
provisions will be likely to facilitate a price increase. The triggering event for antitrust 
                                                             
32 Beginning mainly with United States v. Aluminum Co. of Amer., Inc. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 
1945). 
33 Meyer v. Arthur, 91 U.S. 570, 573 (1875).  See also Bowles v. Gulf Refining Co., 61 F.Supp. 149 
(D.Ohio 1945) (provisions of Emergency Price Control act designed not to affect the way that business is 
conducted in any particular “line of commerce”);  
34 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Citizens’ Nat. Bank of Chickasha, 61 Okla. 112, 160 P. 635 (Okla. 1916) (contract 
interpretation depends upon the customs or usage of trade of “those engaged in that line of commerce”); 
Dixon v. Dunham, 14 Il. 324, 324 (1853) (a usage of trade that is indispensable in a particular “line of 
commerce” is an allowable interpretation); Mobile Fruit & Trading Co. v. J.H. Judy & Son., 91 Ill.App. 
82 (Ill.App. 1900) (“The rule is well recognized that where a commercial contract is in any respect 
ambiguous, and the necessities of the particular line of commerce render a particular custom or usage so 
indispensably necessary as to commend itself,” that usage will be presumed). 
35 See 15 U.S.C. §13(a)  “…where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in 
commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or 
any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the 
jurisdiction of the United States….” ). 
36 15 U.S.C. §14 (“…for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or 
the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United 
States….”). 
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merger analysis is an acquisition that restricts the easiest avenues of substitution just 
enough to permit a price increase that merger policy should condemn.37 
 
Nevertheless, old habits die hard.  Particularly in situations where the acquired 
firm is not the closest rival, the tendency on the part of those defending a merger to 
pursue broader market definitions under traditional criteria.  Those criteria generally 
identify as “in the market” all firms to whom there is some substantial amount of 
substitution in response to a SSNIP, without considering the relative amounts of 
substitution to each firm.  The fact is, however, that the diversion ratio analysis is much 
better suited for assessing market power in product differentiated markets than are 
traditional market definition criteria.  Under the latter, once firms are counted as in the 
market they are more-or-less treated as if they were perfect competitors with one 
another. 
 
 The 2010 Guidelines recognition that merger analysis remains a highly diverse 
exercise also suggests the continuing importance of post-acquisition review.38  Indeed, 
the 2010 Guidelines include a separate section on evidence of actual competitive 
effects observed in the case of consummated mergers (§2.1.1),  The 1982/1984 and 
1992 Guidelines largely ignored the issue and analyzed mergers as if they were 
prospective, as contemplated by the premerger notification process.  The 1968 
Guidelines were issued before the Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification process 
was in place (15 U.S.C. §18a (enacted in 1976)). 
 
All the theory aside, the fact remains that predicting the past is still easier than 
predicting the future.  The social and private costs of undoing a completed merger are 
considerable.  Nevertheless, the proper thing for the Agencies to do is to be cautious 
about mergers that are very close to the margin, but then challenge those that appear to 
be anticompetitive after the fact.  No matter how much information an Agency collects in 
analyzing a merger they never get everything.  The firms themselves always know more 
than the Agencies know.  As a result, in one very strong sense the social cost of a post-
merger challenge is self-inflicted. 
 
Or to say it differently, the merger review process proceeds in two stages, a 
relatively low cost pre-acquisition process that is designed to catch most of the 
troublesome cases in advance, and to this end greatly reduces the cost of post-
acquisition disentanglements.  But the price we pay for the cost savings that attend pre-
merger review is necessarily a few cases that will slip by and require more costly 
intervention later.39 
                                                             
37  See United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.Supp.2d 1098 (N.D.Cal. 2004) (rejecting the government’s 
attempt to focus on this question).  For fairly extreme doubt about the usefulness of market definition in 
antitrust cases generally, see Kaplow, 2010. 
38 On the use, relevance, and limitations of post-acquisition evidence, see Areeda and Hovenkamp, 2009. 
39E.g., Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2008) (post-acquisition condemnation of 
merger; discussing usefulness of post-acquisition evidence); in re Evanston, 2007 WL 2286195 (FTC 
#9315, Aug. 6, 2007). 
Hovenkamp 2010 Merger Guidelines   April, 2011, Page 15 
Bibliography 
 
Areeda, P. E. & Hovenkamp, H. (2007). Antitrust Law, 2, 2A, 2B (NEW YORK: ASPEN)  
Areeda, P. E. & Hovenkamp, H. (2008). Antitrust Law, 3, 3A (NEW YORK: ASPEN 
Areeda, P. E. & Hovenkamp, H. (2009). Antitrust Law. 4,4A (New York: Aspen) 
Areeda, P. E. & Hovenkamp, H. (2010). Antitrust Law.  Supp. (New York: Aspen)  
Bohannan, C & Hovenkamp, H (2011a), Concerted Refusals to License Intellectual 
Property Rights.  Harv.Bus.L.Rev.Bull. ___ (forthcoming) 
Bohannan C. & Hovenkamp H. (2011b). Creation Without Restraint: Promoting Liberty 
and Rivalry in Innovation (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, forthcoming) 
Baker, D. I. & Blumenthal W. (1983). The 1982 Guidelines and Pre-Existing Law.  
California Law Review, 71, 337-338 
Baker J. B. & Bresnahan, T. F. (1985). The Gains from Merger or Collusion in Product–
Differentiated Industries.  Journal of Industrial Economics, 33, 429 
Baker, J. B. (2009).  Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal 
Mergers (In Hylton, K. (Ed.) Antitrust Law and Economics. Northampton: Edward Elgar) 
Baker, J. B. (2010). Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal 
Mergers, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1092248 
Carlton, D. W. (2004). Using Economics to Improve Antitrust Policy. Columbia Business 
Law Review, 2004, 297 
Carlton, D. W. (2010). Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics, 6, 619 
Cave J. & Salant, S. W. (1995). Cartel Quotas under Majority Rule, American Economic 
Review, 85 
Coate, M. B. (2008). Unilateral Effects under the Guidelines: Models, Merits, and 
Merger Policy. available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1263474 
Cohen N. B. & Sullivan, C. A. (1983). The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and the New 
Antitrust Merger Guidelines: Concentrating on Concentration, Texas Law Review, 62, 
453-490 
Hovenkamp 2010 Merger Guidelines   April, 2011, Page 16 
Das Varma, G. (2009). Will Use of the Upward Pricing Pressure Test Lead to an 
Increase in the Level of Merger Enforcement. Antitrust, 24, 27 
Farrell J. & Shapiro, C. (2008). Improving Critical Loss Analysis. Antitrust Source, 
available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/critical2008.pdf  
 
Farell J. & Shapiro, C. (2010) Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic 
Alternative to Market Definition. The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 10, art. 9, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1313782 
 
Gans, J. S. (2007). Concentration-Based Merger Test and Vertical Market Structure. 
Journal of Law and Economics, 50, 662 
Gurrea S. D. & Owen, B. M. (2003). Coordinated Interaction and Clayton §7 
Enforcement. George Mason Law Review, 12, 93-94 
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in Competition. Economic Journal. 39, 41 
Hovenkamp, H. (2010a) The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880-
1960. Iowa Law Review, 95, 914 & n. 237 
Hovenkamp, H. (2010b) The Obama Administration and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
Boston University Law Review, 90, 1611 
Hovenkamp, H. (2010c). Notice and Patent Remedies. Texas Law Review Online 
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1596789 
Hovenkamp, H. (2011) Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its 
Practice.  (St. Paul: West Group 4th ed., forthcoming) 
Kaplow, L.  (2011) Why (Ever) Define Markets? Harvard Law Review 124, 437 
Kaysen C. & Turner, D. F. (1959).  Antitrust Policy: an Economic and Legal Analysis. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press) 
Kovacic, W. E., Marshall, R. C., Marx, L. M., & Schulenberg S. (2009). Quantitative 
Analysis of Coordinated Effects. Antitrust Law Journal, 76, 397 
Kwoka, J. E. (1979) The Effect of Market Share Distribution on Industry Performance. 
Review of Economics and Statistics. 61, 101 
Kwoka, J. E. (1985) The Herfindahl Index in Theory and Practice. Antitrust Bulletin, 30, 
915 
Lande, R.  H. (2001). Resurrecting Incipiency: From Von’s Grocery to Consumer 
Choice. Antitrust Law Journal, 68, 884 
Hovenkamp 2010 Merger Guidelines   April, 2011, Page 17 
 
Leary, T. B. (2002). The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States. 
Antitrust Law Journal, 70, 129 
Ordover, J. A. (2007). Coordinated Effects in Merger Analysis: An Introduction. 
Columbia Business Law Review, 2007, 414 
 
Ordover, J. A. (2008). Coordinated Effects.  (In W.D. Collins, (Ed.) Issues in 
Competition Law and Policy (1359) (Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association) 
Porter, R. H. (2005). Detecting Collusion. Review of Industrial Organization, 26, 157 
Shapiro, C. (1989) Theories of oligopoly behavior. (In R. Schmalensee and R. Willig 
(Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, ch. 6 (San Diego: Elsevier) 
Shapiro, C. (2010). The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: from Hedgehog to Fox in 
Forty Years. Antitrust Law Journal, 77, #1 (forthcoming) 
Stigler, G. J. (1964). A Theory of Oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy 72, 44 
Werden, G. J. (1997). Simulating Unilateral Competitive Effects from Differentiated 
Products Mergers. Antitrust, 11, 27 
Werden G. J. & Froeb, L. M. (2008). Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal 
Mergers.  (In Paulo Buccirossi (Ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics (ch. 3). 
Cambridge: MIT Press.) 
Werden, G. J. (2009). Next Steps in the Evolution of Antitrust Law: What to Expect from 
the Roberts Court. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 5, 61-62 
